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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL EUGENE CROOKSTON,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

!
::

VS.

!

REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO
CROOKSTON HACKING,

::
;
:

De fendant/Appe11ant.

Case No. 940190-CA

Priority No. 4

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING
n/k/a REBECCA ANN BATIO CROOKSTON HACKING

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ALLEGATIONS RAISED IN THE PETITION
DO NOT, ON THEIR FACE, ESTABLISH THAT
A CHANGE OF CUSTODY IS REQUIRED
Crookston argues that because Hacking failed to respond in
time to the default certificate, the allegations raised in his
petition are assumed to be true and that the trial court properly
adopted them as its findings of fact, and based on those findings,
properly found it was in the best interest of the minor children to
change their custody. Crookston cites Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d
593 (Utah App., 1992) as authority for his position.
Stevens also said that:
1

The court in

A trial court asked to render a judgment by default must
first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an
appellant's petition are, on their face, legally
sufficient to establish a valid claim against the
defaulting party.
The allegations

raised by Crookston

in his petition

are that

Hacking moved several times with the children; that she did not
always let Crookston know her whereabouts; that she developed poor
housekeeping habits;

that she did not kept the children clean;

that she was receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children; and
that she was living with a man to whom she was not married.

In

contrast, Crookston points out that he has remarried and has a
house.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 160-63.)

It is submitted that these

allegations, as those raised in Stevens, do not on their face,
establish

that there has been a material

ability to properly care for the children.

change

in Hacking's

In his detailed version

of the facts, Crookston alleges that he has had problems since 1988
with Hacking taking the children and not letting him know of their
whereabouts.

(Brief of Appellee, p. 4.)

In September of 1990,

Crookston stipulated to Hacking having custody, in spite of those
allegations. (Brief of Appellee, p. 4.)

It appears that Crookston

was not concerned enough about Hacking's movements to say she was
an unfit parent.
Simply because Hacking may have moved on several occasions,
and not kept Crookston fully informed of her whereabouts, does not
necessarily mean that the children lacked proper care.
hearing going into the details would establish that fact.

Only a
It would

be necessary to determine why the moves took place, why notice may
2

not have always been given, and the affect of both on the children.
Crookston points out in his brief that Hacking has alleged abuse of
the children by him.

(Brief of Appellee, p. 4.)

the same allegation recently.
80,

384-85.)

It would

Hacking has made

(Record on Appeal, pp. 390-91, 377-

seem that the allegation needs to be

considered in connection with Hacking's reasons for moving around.
There may also be a question whether Crookston was always available
to receive messages since there is no evidence of his whereabouts.
Crookston

acknowledges

in his petition that Hacking was

initially a good housekeeper, but he now claims that she has
developed poor housekeeping habits.

An initial question is what

Crookston means in saying that Hacking is a poor housekeeper.

It

could mean very little as far as having any adverse affect upon the
children.

It does not necessarily follow that because one is a

poor housekeeper, one is also a poor parent. Hacking suggests that
many rich parents with immaculate houses have proven to be unfit
parents.

Hacking also wonders how Crookston has been in a position

to judge Hacking's housekeeping abilities if he has not known her
whereabouts.

It is not as easy to keep a house spotless as

children come or sickness sets in or other unforeseen events take
place. More information would have to be gathered to determine the
extent of the problem, its causes and its affect upon the children
before saying that a change of custody is proper.

The same can be

said for the allegation that the children are not kept clean.
does not know what Crookston means by "clean."

One

Perhaps it has been

assumed that the children are not clean because on one occasion one

3

of them did not smell good. There is no information on the type of
odor, its causes, or how often it was detected.
football

can

cause one to

smell.

A hearty game of

There may

be

a

logical

explanation for the bad odor, and it does not necessarily follow
that the children are not otherwise receiving proper care.
Crookston also appears to be saying that a change of custody
is justified because at the time the petition was filed Hacking was
receiving AFDC and living with a man to whom she was not married.
Hacking believes that Crookston cannot seriously say that because
one is receiving public assistance that person is a bad parent. It
is common knowledge that there are millions of good parents in our
society, who for one reason or another, have received public
assistance.

Nor can Crookston seriously say that because Hacking

was living with a man out of wedlock she is a bad parent.

The

boyfriend may be an excellent source of support, stability, or
guidance to the children.
The upshot is that the allegations raised by Crookston in his
petition justifying a change of custody are not sufficient on their
face.
Crookston also suggests that he is the more fit parent because
he has remarried and has a house.

Hacking does not see how those

two facts lead to the conclusion that the children would be better
off with him.

One with the bigger or newer house

is not

necessarily the best parent. Nor can it be said that a remarriage
is necessarily in the best interest of children.

4

POINT TWO
HACKING HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Crookston appears to be arguing that Hacking is alleging, for
the first time on appeal, that the lower court erred in not taking
any evidence before changing custody and awarding child support and
attorney fees to Crookston.

After Crookston filed a default

certificate, Hacking's prior counsel filed a motion to set aside
the default judgment and an accompanying memorandum.
Appeal, pp. 181-84.)

(Record on

In that memorandum, Hacking stated:

This case represents the future of small children and
their interest's must be protected, we are not in receipt
of any evaluations by qualified experts. Nor have any
material allegations as to the childrens welfare be(en)
raised other than they have been subject to several
moves.
I would ask the court to allow my clients the
opportunity to respond to the complaint as they do have
a legitimate defense to the allegations of the plaintiff.
(Record on Appeal, p. 184.)
When Hacking's present counsel entered the case, just prior to the
hearing on Crookston's motion for default judgment, he filed a
supplemental memorandum of points and authorities.
Appeal, pp. 234-38.)

(Record on

In that memorandum Hacking stated, in urging

the court to set aside the default certificate:
The Petition raises serious allegations. Plaintiff seeks
to change the custody
of three minor children from
Defendant to Plaintiff. In considering those allegations
the Court must put the children first. It must decide if
there has been a substantial change in circumstances
justifying a change of
custody and also whether it
would be in the best interest of
the children to change
custody.
It is submitted that it is critical to the
children that these issues be decided after a full
hearing rather than on the basis of a default
5

certificate.
When

the

motion

(Record on Appeal, p. 237.)
for

default

judgment

was

argued

before

the

commissioner, Hacking's present counsel stated the same argument,
though

not very well.

(Record

on Appeal, pp.

336-37,

341.)

Present counsel also made the same argument to the trial court
judge by saying:
Now, the effect of that order if you — if you let that
order stand, what that means is that the defendant in
this case is denied a trial. That means you're going to
have a change of custody from one parent to another
without any evidence being taken.
And we're talking
about children that aren't real, real young. They're not
real old, but their ages are 13, 12 and eight. I also
means you're awarding child support and attorney fees
without — without a hearing.
Now, the way I view this, Your Honor, is there — there
are very few issues that come before the Court that are
more important than child custody. And anytime the Court
gets one of those sort of issues, that places a heavy
burden on the Court. And my understanding is you — you
really don't want to change custody from one parent to
another, unless you can show that there's been a
substantial change in circumstance, and that number two,
it would be in the best interest of the children to make
that change. (Record on Appeal, p. 352.)
The issues of custody, child support and attorney fees go together.
A child support award can only be determined after custody is
decided.

Attorney fees are likewise affected by who is awarded

custody.

All of these issues were clearly raised at the trial

level, as illustrated above.

POINT THREE
HACKING CLEARLY POINTED OUT HOW
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
Crookston argues that Hacking has failed to point out how the

6

trial judge abused his discretion.

Hacking believes she clearly

stated that the trial judge abused his discretion in changing the
custody of the minor children from Hacking to Crookston without
holding an evidentiary hearing.

Hacking's summary of argument

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 6-7.) and argument (Record on Appeal pp.
7-10.) center on that point.
Hacking's prior counsel sought to set aside the default
certificate pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Record on Appeal, pp. 181-84.) While prior counsel concentrated
on Rule 60(b)(1), both prior and present counsel also urged the
court to set aside the default certificate in order to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine if it would be in the best
interest of the minor children to have a change of custody.

Rule

60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly empowers the court
to set aside a default judgment, ". . . for any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

Hacking

has continually argued that she should have been given relief from
the default certificate and that the trial court erred in not
granting it.
POINT FOUR
HACKING IS NOT BARRED FROM PROSECUTING
HER APPEAL THOUGH SHE HAS BEEN HELD IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT
Crookston argues that Hacking is barred from prosecuting her
appeal because she has been held in contempt of court. This appeal
is from the default judgment granted by the trial court on November
7

18, 1994. (Record on Appeal, pp 246-48.)

Hacking was not in

contempt when that order was executed and filed. Hacking was found
in contempt on May 31, 1994 (Record on Appeal, pp. 402-5.)

as a

result of an order to show cause initially signed by the court on
March 10, 1994.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 316-17.)

seeking relief from that order.

Hacking is not

The contempt stemmed from Hacking

retaining custody of the children in Oregon after the default
judgment was granted.

(Record on Appeal, pp. 276-77.)

Hacking

believed it would be in the best interest of the children to remain
in Oregon with her, and it was her hope that the trial court judge
would overturn the order of the commissioner.
pp. 292-94.)
her.

(Record on Appeal,

It was a very emotional and difficult situation for

Once the trial judge ruled against her, Hacking immediately

filed a motion for stay of default judgment and order overruling
and denying objection to recommendation of commissioner.
on Appeal, pp. 290-91.)

(Record

Hacking was convinced the children should

not be turned over to Crookston for the reasons set forth in the
affidavits, (Record on Appeal, pp. 377-80, 384-85, 390-91.) and so
sought to retain their custody until the appeal was over.

The

order of the trial judge was filed March 7, 1994. (Record on
Appeal, pp.

262-64.) Hacking's motion for a stay was filed March

21, 1994, (Record on Appeal, pp. 290-91.).

The matter was set for

hearing on April 6, 1994. (Record on Appeal, pp. 295-96.) Counsel
for Crookston then asked that the April

6, 1994 hearing be

continued, which it was. (Record on Appeal, pp. 303.-04.) Counsel
for Hacking then attempted to obtain another hearing date, but
8

found that counsel for Crookston had an extremely heavy schedule.
The first open date available to counsel for Crookston was May 31,
1994.

In order to accommodate counsel for Crookston, counsel for

Hacking agreed to have Hacking appear on that date to answer to the
order to show cause, rather than requiring Crookston to serve
Hacking personally.

By the time the matter came on for hearing,

the children were with Crookston and the trial court judge ruled
that the motion to stay the change of custody was moot.
Appeal, p. 404.)

(Record on

For the above reasons, Hacking believes that she

has the right to be heard on her appeal, in spite of the contempt
order.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted
that the concerns raised by Crookston in his brief are without
merit.

The default judgment should be set aside and the trial

court instructed to take evidence on whether there has been a
substantial change in circumstance justifying a change of custody
and whether it would be in the best interest of the children to
make a change. The court should also determine what, if any, child
support and attorney fees should^be awarded,
DATED this ^ ^ d a y

/,

of >cl<^

, 1994

UTAH I4EGAL SERVICES/^ItfC.
By: Stephen W. JuYien
Attorneys for Defendant
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